The context for discussing multiple comparisons is statistical hypothesis testing and p values, which we dealt with cursorily in our earlier commentary (1) and which Dr. Thompson addresses in detail (2). He organizes the sequence of questions as follows: Should hypothesis tests be used? If they are used, should they be based onp values? If p values are used, should they be adjusted for multiple comparisons? We fully agree with his first two answers, namely "infrequently" and "no," but appear to differ on the third question, to which he answers "yes." Even on this point, however, the differences are more in strategy than in the underlying goals.
As noted elsewhere, statistical analysis of observational data "should be limited to pattern detection and recognition" (3, p. 227). That is, we examine the data and organize it to facilitate a clear understanding of what it can tell us about the substantive phenomenon of interest. From this perspective, statistics are not "descriptive" or "inferential"; they can only be descriptive, since it is the user of the data who draws any inferences. Some statistical tools are more useful in this context, such as a risk ratio or linear regression coefficient, whereas others are presented as inferences, such as the result of a statistical hypothesis test defined as rejection or failure to reject the null hypothesis. Confidence intervals are intended to be used as descriptors of a range of values and associated levels of confidence (4), but are often abused as statistical tests. As descriptors of the patterns in the data, measures of effect such as risk ratios, confidence intervals on those measures, and even p values (although they are not very useful for data description) need not be adjusted. On all these points, we agree with Dr. Thompson. The key point of departure is whether, having gotten so far as to test hypotheses statistically with p values, one can then abandon the framework and fail to adjust for multiple comparisons. If the investigator has some reason to rely on methods of formal statistical inference, difficult to imagine in observational epidemiology (5), then the rules must be followed to permit the desired, formal interpretation (2). The key question is at what point in the pathway the investigator can abandon the constraints of the hypothesis testing paradigm. We agree with Dr. Thompson that exiting earlier is better, ideally at the point of articulating the study goal as quantifying an association (6) as opposed to testing a statistical hypothesis. However, departing somewhere along the way seems preferable to maintaining the formal structure all the way to the bitter end of making formal adjustments for multiple comparisons.
The concern with "cheating," in this case failing to follow the formal rules of hypothesis testing but still drawing the inferences they were intended to provide, is based on a desire to ensure appropriate caution in data interpretation. The danger of erroneous dismissal of meaningful results based on the technology of statistical hypothesis testing and adjustment for multiple comparisons is rarely raised. Instead, such procedures are viewed as restraining the investigator from invoking every measure of association as worthy of action or even attention. Informal calculations of elements of hypothesis testing, followed by formal interpretation, do constitute cheating (2). However, if the goal is to ensure conservatism in the interpretation of data, one not well served by p values (7), other approaches should be considered. We argued for comprehensively evaluating the usual candidate sources of potentially spurious epidemiologic study results, such as confounding and various other forms of bias (1), as well as random error.
Findings of previous epidemiologic studies and those from other disciplines are also critical to the interpretation of the cumulative evidence after a new study is completed. Goodman (8) notes the need for caution in acceptance of ostensibly supporting ancillary evidence, and we agree. Critical evaluation of the strength of such evidence is a familiar and appropriate forum for debate and seems more likely to be constructive than debates over such issues as how many 814 Savitz and Olshan statistical tests were performed and when the hypothesis was formulated.
Strategies are being developed and applied to refine estimates based on the suspected role of random error (9). The goal of these empirical Bayes and semi-Bayes methods is not to adjust p values for multiple comparisons, but rather to develop more accurate measures of association based on the full array of available information (10) . It is difficult to see how adherence to a statistical hypothesis-testing framework, with or without adjustment for multiple comparisons, serves that goal.
